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Forum on State and Local Fiscal Crises

The 2002 Downturn in State Revenues:
A Comparative Review and Analysis
Abstract - We analyze the behavior of state revenues since the early
1950s to determine the severity of the revenue declines experienced
by states after the 2001 recession. Both total state revenues for the
nation and state–level data for each state are studied. We conclude
that the states were indeed hit with an unprecedented downturn
in revenues—unlike anything that had been experienced in the
preceding half–century. Further and contrary to general perceptions, revenue increases in the years preceding the downturn were
not particularly strong compared to revenue increases in the years
leading up to previous recessions. We further conclude that most
proposed budget rules dealing with either taxes, spending, or savings would have been insufﬁcient to address the states’ problems
and that states will need major discretionary structural changes in
state revenues and expenditures to return to ﬁscal balance.
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s the state budget crisis that had its origins in the economic expansion of the late 1990s and the recession that
began in 2001 sui generis or simply a variant of recent state
budget cycles? This is a key issue in assessing blame, if
any, for the state budget crises and in planning to improve
state decisionmaking. The most important issue is whether
appropriate budget rules could have eliminated or at least
ameliorated much of the pain that states suffered from the
economic downturn.
In its impact on state revenues and in the disconnect
with economic conditions, the current state budget cycle of
expanding revenues followed by precipitous declines may
be a one–of–a–kind phenomenon, the proverbial hundred
year ﬂood or perfect storm, that is extremely unlikely to occur again. Alternatively, the cycle may simply be a different
version of past cycles that might have been foreseen and
responded to better with fuller understanding.
In this paper, we review and analyze the behavior of state
revenues since the early 1950s—a period that includes nine
recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. In the ﬁrst section of the paper, we conduct
an analysis of aggregate state–level data over the last half
century. We follow this section with a detailed analysis of
state–level data, spanning the last 25 years, which includes
111
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pectations based on past cycles and given
political constraints that rule out many
responses. Furthermore, no reasonable
budget rule could have allowed states to
navigate the recent ﬂuctuations on automatic pilot. However, this does not excuse
what appears to be the slow, temporizing
response of most states once the magnitude of the problems became apparent
(see Maag and Merriman (2003)).

the dual recessions of the early 1980s, the
1990 recession associated with the Gulf
War, and the recession of 2001 associated
with the end of the stock market bubble.
Using the information developed in the
ﬁrst two sections, we develop a stylized
simulation examining various policies
that a representative state might have undertaken during the expansion to manage
its budget in preparation for the economic
downturn. We focus on how various
proposed automatic or semi–automatic
budget rules limiting discretionary tax
and spending changes might have mitigated the problems states are currently
facing. We conclude with a brief assessment of how well states have managed
their ﬁscal affairs given the magnitude of
the downturn and the political constraints
that they face.
The aggregate data suggest that the
states were indeed hit with an unprecedented downturn in revenues—unlike
anything that had been experienced in
the preceding half–century. Further and
contrary to general perceptions, revenue
increases in the years preceding the
downturn were not particularly strong
compared to revenue increases in the
years leading up to previous recessions.
Not surprisingly, all states were not impacted in the same way during the recent
recession nor was it the worst recent
downturn for all states. For some states,
the dual recessions of the early 1980s were
associated with larger revenue declines
(as a share of state income). However,
relative to the severity of the recession,
the underperformance of revenues was
most pronounced in ﬁscal 2002.
Are the states themselves to blame for
their current situation? The simulation
analysis seems to exonerate the states,
suggesting that there was little the states
could have done, given reasonable ex1
2

DATA AND DEFINITIONS
In this paper, we focus on own–source
general tax revenues. This is the largest
component of state revenue and has been
relatively stable at around 76 percent of
total own–source revenue over the last
decade.1 And, unlike other state budget
data, state tax revenue is available for ﬁscal 2003. This provides one and sometimes
two additional years of crucial data for
the states compared to other revenue and
expenditure information. The use of tax
revenues focuses on the most important
and most cyclically–sensitive component
of state ﬁnance. We do not provide here a
full treatment of the state budget process
through an examination of both expenditures and revenues.2 However, the analysis
of revenues makes it possible to evaluate
options for both revenue enhancements
and/or expenditure cuts that would help
bring the budgets into balance. The focus
on revenue changes highlights the magnitude of the problems states face, but it
does not shed much light on the resources
states have to deal with these problems
or the manner in which the problems are
resolved. At this stage, most states have
yet to resolve these issues fully.
A number of studies assessing the
impact of the recent recessions on state
finances use combined state and local
revenues (see Knight, Kusko, and Ru-

The coefﬁcient of correlation between tax revenue and total revenue is .984 for this period.
The analysis is largely descriptive and is not based on a formal model of the budget behavior of the states
such as Poterba (1994).
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the Census numbers used here do not correspond exactly to the numbers reported
in most state budgets and in the press nor
do they relate precisely to the revenues
used in calculations of state budget deﬁcits or shortfalls. However, the data used
here are highly correlated with the other
measures and they are collected using
a consistent classiﬁcation system that is
applied to all states.
Because of its inclusiveness, the general
revenue category used in this analysis is
likely to be somewhat more stable than
typical general fund revenues since it
includes motor fuel taxes and other excise
taxes. Motor fuel taxes are often levied on
a unit basis and do not vary as much during the business cycle as income tax and
sales tax receipts.
To deal with population and price
changes over the time period, tax revenues are measured in per capita, real
(ﬁscal 2003) dollars. Revenues combine
both the impacts of the economy and of
discretionary changes in tax structures. In
the last ten years, discretionary changes
have had relatively little impact on state
revenues.3

bin (2003), Garret (2003), Daly (2003),
and The Wall Street Journal (2003)). The
performance of combined state and local
revenues often does not provide a good
picture of either state or local revenues
because considerable differences exist
between the behavior of these revenues.
In particular, local government revenue
performed much better during the recent
downturn because of local governments’
reliance on the property tax. Property tax
revenues, the almost exclusive province
of local governments, increased during
the economic downturn because of the
stability of the assessment base as well
as rate increases. Property taxes in ﬁscal
years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 increased
4.5, 5.3, 10.2 and 1.3 percent respectively.
The Wall Street Journal (2003), for example, recently noted that, “state and
local receipts have been rising smartly
for the past six quarters, reaching a new
quarterly record . . . .” It uses this evidence
to argue that state governments are in a
strong ﬁscal position, and further asserts
that complaints over state governments’
poor ﬁscal health are merely disingenuous
attempts by those looking for an excuse
to raise taxes.
The term general revenues as used here
is a Census Bureau classiﬁcation that includes all state government activity except
state–run liquor stores, utilities, and insurance trusts. This is a more comprehensive
category than the commonly–used general fund budget designation. In a typical
fund accounting framework used in most
states, general fund activities include most
core state activities, but exclude major
functional areas, such as transportation,
which are segregated in non–general fund
accounts such as the road fund. Therefore,
3

4

AGGREGATE RESULTS: FIFTY YEARS
OF STATE REVENUES
Descriptive Analysis
We now compare the behavior of state
tax revenues before, during, and after the
recession of 2001 with other downturns
over the last 50 years. This is done descriptively with several different charts.
Figure 1 depicts state tax revenues as a
percentage of GDP from the early 1950s
until 2003.4 The most striking aspect of
this chart in not the cyclical behavior of

See National Governors Association and National Association of State Budget Ofﬁcers (2003). Net enacted changes
reduced the annual real growth of tax revenues by approximately one percent a year from 1996 to 2001, had virtually no impact in 2002, and increased revenues by 1.5 percent in 2003. The effects are signiﬁcantly smaller than the
impacts of changes during the 1980s and early 1990s. “Enacted changes” is a term used by National Association of
State Budget Ofﬁcers to disentangle changes generated by the economy and discretionary changes in tax laws.
The years referred to throughout this paper regarding revenues and budget issues are ﬁscal years.
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Figure 1.

State Taxes as Percentage of GDP

During the four recessions prior to 1973,
the cyclical impacts of recessions on tax
revenues were largely swamped by the
secular ramping up of state tax burdens.
The only declines in the last 30 years were
after the 1973, 1980, 1990 and 2001 recessions. The decline after the 2001 recession
was by far the greatest with state taxes
falling from 5.7 to 5.1 percent of GDP over
a two–year period. The other post–1970
declines were much smaller—around
one–tenth of one percentage point. With
the exception of 2001, the declines were
erased in a year or two by natural revenue
growth and discretionary increases.
As a percentage of GDP, state taxes
rose from 3.0 percent in 1950 to 5.5 percent in 1975. Since 1975, state taxes have
hovered around the 5.5 percent level with
no signiﬁcant upward trend. It is interesting to note that the rapid growth of state
tax revenues as well as state and local
revenues halted several years before the
widely publicized tax protest movements
such as Proposition 13 in California and
Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts in the
late 1970s as well as the “Reagan revolution” of the early 1980s.5

tax revenues, but the marked contrast
between the ﬁrst and the last half of the
period. The period before the mid–1970s
was one of rapid expansion of state government. States during this period were
expanding their activities on a number
of fronts, most notably in education. In
most states, the ﬁnancing of primary and
secondary education was shifting from
local governments (school districts) to the
states. Public higher education, which is
largely a state function, also expanded
rapidly during this period.
This pre–1970 period was also a time of
change for state tax systems. States had
moved away from the property tax before
this period and began to rely more heavily
on broad general taxes such as the general
sales tax and eventually, the income tax. In
1950, the individual income tax accounted
for less than 10 percent of state tax revenues. By 1975, this ratio had increased to
about 24 percent. By 2000, the income tax
had risen to more than one–third of state
tax revenues. These increases were the
result of the adoption of the tax by more
states and by higher rates imposed with
existing taxes.
5

State and local taxes as a percentage of GDP reached a peak in 1972 and then fell for several years. The 1972
peak was not exceeded until the early 1990s.
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ﬁscal 2002 followed by another decline
on a lower base in 2003 of 1.8 percent.
The ﬁscal 2002 reduction was almost nine
times as large as the previous worst performance, while 2003 was twice as large as
any pre–2001 decline. The relative size of
the 2002 decline was largely the result of
the economy. Major tax adjustments are
usually not accomplished in the ﬁrst year
of a downturn. The second–year decline
in revenue (2003) was the compound effect of a continued downturn along with
few states raising taxes to cope with the
recession.
Note that the declines for ﬁscal 2002
and 2003 were in the context of one of
the mildest recession on record although
the recovery from the recession has been
much slower than normal.7 It has been
suggested that the 2001 recession was a
throwback to recessions of the nineteenth
century that resulted from vast overinvestment in speciﬁc industries (railroads
then, telecommunications and information technology now). The decline in asset
values and investment, not employment

Figure 2 conﬁrms the widely publicized
statement that the ﬁscal problems of the
states (at least in terms of revenue) are
the worst since World War II.6 The year
2002 is the only time when revenues fell
in current dollar terms. This is the result of
a combination of the effects of a steep real
revenue decline along with a historically
low inﬂation rate.
In the past, states have considered it a
crisis when revenues did not keep pace
with inﬂation. Note in Figure 2 that, prior
to 2001, this was a rare occurrence. During
the last half of the twentieth century, there
were only 5 years when real per capita
state tax revenues fell: the recessions of
1958, 1974, 1981, 1982, and 1991. In these
years, the declines were modest: 0.6, 0.9,
0.7, 0.7, and 0.5 percent respectively. Previously, the only back–to–back decline in
state revenues occurred during the double
dip recessions of the early 1980s. Real revenues actually increased in the recessions
of 1953, 1960, and 1969.
Contrast this with the recession of 2001.
Here real revenues fell by 7.9 percent for
Figure 2.

6
7

Annual Changes in Per Capita State Taxes: Nominal and Real

While the data are not included, the results discussed here apply to the period 1945–1951 as well.
A 2003 NBER analysis shows that real GDP, retail sales, and industrial product all declined less steeply in the
2001 recession compared to the average of eight previous recessions, but recovered at a slower rate. (http://
www.nber.org/cycles/hall.pdf)
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and consumption, characterized the recent
recession.
It has been alleged that states had an
unprecedented run up of revenues in the
period before the downturn in ﬁscal 2002.
The combination of a booming economy
and an even more vibrant stock market
produced revenue windfalls unmatched
by past experience. A corollary of this is
the assertion that states mismanaged their
ﬁnances during the boom period instead
of taking precautions for the eventual
downturn.
We examine this issue in Figure 3 and
Table 1. Figure 3 provides information
about the two– and four–year cumulative
per capita tax revenue increases calculated
on a rolling basis from 1953 to 2003. Figure 3 suggests that the years just before the
2001 recession were certainly productive
in terms of state revenues, but not out of
character with previous pre–recession
expansions. The cumulative two– and
four–year revenue increase was actually
lower than most similar previous periods.
This is presented in more detail in Table 1.
Here the cumulative four–year pre–recession increase in real per capita state tax
Figure 3.

TABLE 1
GROWTH OF STATE TAX REVENUES BEFORE
AND AFTER RECENT RECESSIONS
(Real Per Capita)
Recession
(Beginning Quarter)
July 1953(II)
August 1957(III)
April 1960(II)
December 1969(IV)
November 1973(IV)
January 1980(I)
July 1981(III)
July 1990(III)
March 2001(I)

Previous 4
Years (%)
20.8
19.3
13.7
36.2
28.3
12.9
5.2
12.4
12.5

Next 2
Years (%)
3.8
–0.5
7.6
8.9
0.4
–2.7
–3.3
–1.1
–9.6

revenues and the two–year post–recession
revenue impacts are presented for the
nine post–1950 recessions. Note that the
results of the 1981 recession are hard to
interpret because that recession occurred
before a full recovery took place from the
1980 recession.
Excluding 1981, the four–year revenue
increase before 2001 was among the lowest pre–recession periods on record, just
barely surpassing the pre–1990 revenue
increase. Note also that the two–year post–
recession decline after the 2001 recession is
by far the most negative on record, nearly
three times the next largest percentage

Cumulative 2–Year and 4–Year Changes in Real Per Capita State Taxes
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welfare reform period. Even the cost of
pensions became less onerous because
the rapid increase in equity values had a
dramatic impact on pension fund assets,
thus reducing pension funding obligations. Some states were able to reduce or
eliminate pension fund contributions during this period because stock market gains
took care of their obligations. Together the
unexpected revenue growth along with
a surprising moderation in expenditure
demands created what one might call a
golden era for state ﬁnance.
In summary, the descriptive results suggest a decline in state revenues after the
2001 recession that is unmatched in the
last 50 years. Further, the decline is not
the result of an anomalous pre–recession
revenue growth that led to the ultimate
decline.

decrease. While the causes of the decline
in revenues––in many states for a second
straight year (ﬁscal 2003)––are not fully
understood, part of the reductions are the
result of the major decline in ﬁnancial asset values that continued during calendar
2002 after the recession had technically
ended. It may also have resulted because
income declines were disproportionately
large for very high income taxpayers (with
reductions in bonuses and stock options).
To the extent that state income taxes are
progressive, such changes have a larger
impact on tax revenues.
Part of the perception about rapid revenue growth in the 1990s may have been
generated by other factors. In addition to
fairly rapid growth, states were experiencing windfall revenue gains and windfall
surpluses. The unexpected gains occurred
because state revenue growth was systematically underestimated each year
during this period as was the case with
federal revenues. The tobacco settlement
funds also added to the state revenues. In
addition, expenditure demands were less
pressing as compared to prior experience.
For example, medical care inﬂation abated
during the latter part of the 1990s. States
with their heavy Medicaid burdens had
become accustomed to double–digit cost
increases and were pleasantly surprised
when costs went up less steeply. Welfare
roles also declined during the post–1996

Analytical Results
In this section, we employ a time–series
econometric model to explain state revenue performance. Our dependent variable is the annual change in real per capita
state tax revenue. Our three explanatory
variables are the annual change in real per
capita income, the percentage of state tax
revenue from the individual income tax,
and the annual percentage change in the
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). The
results are presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2
PER CAPITA CHANGE IN REAL STATE TAX REVENUES
Variable
Percentage change in real income

Model 1A
1.058352
(5.62)

Percentage of revenue from income tax

Model 1B
1.000859
(5.65)

Model 1C
1.093540
(6.26)

–0.130401
(–2.86)

–0.132612
(–3.03)

Percentage change in DJIA

0.058754
(2.27)

Constant

–0.002573
(–0.34)

R–square

0.39

0.030134
(2.24)

0.022914
(1.73)

0.48

0.53

t–values in parentheses
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do not fully explain the decrease in revenue after the 2001 recession. The results
indicate that revenues behaved in a very
unusual manner during and after the 2001
recession. The residuals can be thought
of as revenue shortfalls that state experienced compared to reasonable expectations. The negative residuals for 2002 are
the largest of any of the 51 years in the
series. The residuals for 2001 and 2003 are
also very large and negative. This is true
for all three formulations.
A similar phenomenon occurred at the
federal level where there was an unexpected and largely unexplained reduction
in federal tax revenues.9 The revenue decline after the 2001 recession is at least a
“50–year” ﬂood, a virtually one–of–a–kind
event. In a sense, the unexpected and not
fully explained decline in revenues after
the 2001 recession is a kind of apology for
state ﬁscal behavior. It may explain why
states were not better prepared for the
downturn and why their initial responses
to the problems were often weak given the
magnitude of the problem.
Except for 2000, these results also
conﬁrm the observation that the revenue
growth in the years leading up to the 2001
recession was not unusually strong. The
residuals in all three speciﬁcations from
1996 to 1999 were either negative or very
small positive values. The implications of
these results for state budget policy are
explored below.

Model lA estimates revenue changes
based solely on income changes, Model 1B
is based on income changes and income tax
reliance, and Model 1C employs all three
explanatory variables. The variables are
signiﬁcant in each of the formulations. The
models explain from 39 to 53 percent of the
variation. The change in income variable
is highly signiﬁcant in all three models.
Both change of income and change in the
DJIA have the expected sign. The income
tax reliance variable has a negative sign
suggesting that increased reliance on the
income tax provides stability (i. e., reduces
the expected change in tax revenues), a
seemingly counterintuitive result. An alternative explanation is that the income tax
reliance variable may be serving as a proxy
for time since reliance increased fairly
steadily over the period of the analysis
while overall volatility declined.
The inﬂation rate was also included
as an explanatory variable, but it did not
prove signiﬁcant and did not add to the
explanatory power of the analysis. Since
the analysis is conducted using real values, the direct impact of the inﬂation rate
is accounted for. However, the tax system
could have non–neutralities with respect
to inﬂation such as “bracket creep” for
the income tax or the erosion of revenues
for speciﬁc excise taxes such as those imposed on gasoline, alcohol, and tobacco.
These effects do not appear to have been
signiﬁcant.8
The results of the estimates were used
to produce residuals for each year for each
equation. These results are presented in
Figure 4, Panels 1, 2, & 3. The residuals
suggest that the explanatory variables
8

9

STATE–LEVEL REVENUE RESULTS
The analysis of state tax revenues in aggregate may mask variations in revenue

On the expenditure side of the ﬁscal equation, high inﬂation rates may ease some budget problems. For example,
it is much easier for a state to provide nominal wage and salary increases several percentage points below the
inﬂation rate in a high–inﬂation environment. This is not possible when the inﬂation rate is near zero.
In this regard, the 2003 Economic Report of the President states, “The decline in receipts during the most recent
downturn in the business cycle has been especially pronounced. Total receipts in ﬁscal 2002 were $1,853 billion,
having fallen $138 billion, or about 7 percent, from their level in ﬁscal 2001. This represented a much larger
percentage decrease in receipts than in previous, far more severe recessions. … More detailed information
on the precise sources of the decline in receipts will not be available until the Treasury completes its regular
annual examination of individual tax returns.”
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Figure 4.

Unexplained Variations in Real Per Capita State Tax Revenues
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1982 were also very bad for a number of
states, especially in the Midwest which
suffered the brunt of the 1980 and 1981
recessions.
Tax revenue performance by region for
2001 and 2002 is presented in Figure 8.
The results show that revenue problems
arrived early (2001) in the Great Lakes
and were extremely severe in the Far
West (with California, Alaska, and Oregon
being three of the four worst performing
states) and New England in 2002.
To determine how states performed
relative to expectations, we carry out an
analysis related to the work above, but
using panel data from the 50 states. (See
the Appendix for a fuller description of the
approach.) The results presented here are
based on a model that includes only state
personal income and state ﬁxed effects as
the explanatory variables.11
The difference between the actual and
predicted tax revenues is derived for each
state and each year.12 To normalize this

performance among the states. In this
section, we conduct a similar analysis to
that in the preceding section, but based on
state–level revenues spanning from 1977
to 2002.10 Figure 5 presents information
about the nominal change in tax revenue
for 2002 over 2001. Thirty–nine states suffered nominal declines in revenue. Fiscal
2002 was the worst real revenue performance for 28 states for the 1977–2002
period—the result of the combination
of a real decline and a historically low
rate of inﬂation. The poor performance
in the early 1980s was masked by high
inﬂation.
Table 3 and Figure 6 present similar
information in real terms. Forty–two
of the 50 states suffered real declines in
revenue. Seven states had double digit
declines including California’s 15 percent.
However, 2002, while still the worst year
since 1977 in real terms for a plurality of
states, does not appear as bad in relative
terms. (See Figure 7.) The years 1981 and
Figure 5.

10

11

12

Percentage Change in Nominal State Tax Revenues: 2002

The data include both the impacts of the economy as well as “enacted changes.” Overall, the impact of enacted
changes was very small in recent years. See footnote 3 and Maag and Merriman (2003). However, the impacts
of enacted changes may be more substantial for particular states.
We also explored other speciﬁcations that included information on state employment and states’ reliance on
the personal income tax. Results from these speciﬁcations were very similar to those from the model that only
included personal income.
An alternative way of addressing underperformance would have been to include a year dummy in the analysis.
When this was done, the size of the 2002 dummy was strongly negative for almost all states.
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TABLE 3
% CHANGE IN REAL STATE TAX REVENUES: 2002
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Figure 6.

Alaska
California
Massachusetts
Oregon
Idaho
South Carolina
New Mexico
Connecticut
Colorado
Rhode Island
New Jersey
U. S.
Oklahoma
Minnesota
Georgia
North Dakota
Utah
Kansas
New York
Montana
Tennessee
Illinois
Iowa
Wyoming
Texas
Hawaii

–24.6
–15.0
–14.9
–13.8
–12.2
–11.4
–10.4
–9.7
–9.5
–6.4
–5.9
–5.8
–5.6
–5.5
–5.2
–5.1
–4.7
–4.7
–4.6
–4.6
–4.1
–4.1
–4.0
–3.7
–3.7
–3.6

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Virginia
Pennsylvania
Michigan
Missouri
Maine
Nebraska
Vermont
Indiana
Florida
Mississippi
North Carolina
Washington
South Dakota
Ohio
Maryland
Wisconsin
Arkansas
Arizona
Kentucky
Alabama
Louisiana
Nevada
Delaware
West Virginia
New Hampshire

–3.4
–3.0
–2.9
–2.9
–2.7
–2.6
–2.3
–2.3
–1.6
–1.5
–1.5
–1.5
–1.2
–1.1
–0.8
–0.7
–0.2
0.3
0.4
0.8
0.9
1.8
2.1
2.6
6.1

Percentage Change in Real State Tax Revenues: 2002

residual, it is divided by the actual state
revenue. Figure 9 presents the results
of this analysis of underperformance.
The results are similar, but not identical
to those presented earlier with Alaska,
California, and Oregon faring very poorly.
Tax revenues in 48 of the 50 states underperformed in 2002 in the sense that actual
revenues fell short of predicted levels that

included the impacts of changes in state
personal income.
Figure 10 shows that 2002 was the
worst year for underperformance in
14 states during the 1977–2002 period,
more states than in any other year. However, a number of states experienced their
worst years in the recessions of 1980 and
1981.
121
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Figure 7.

Year of Worst Real Revenue Performance

Figure 8.

Tax Revenue Performance by Region: 2001 and 2002

Figure 9.

Underperformance of Revenue (Residuals as Percentage of Actual): 2002
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Figure 10.

Year of Worst Underperformance of Revenue

a broad–based income tax nor a general
sales tax, New Hampshire was one of the
few states that avoided most of the ﬁscal
pain of the downturn.
In this section, we focused on the performance of state–level tax revenues. Underperformance of revenues is not necessarily
a measure of ﬁscal crisis, but it suggests
the magnitude of the problems that must
be addressed. The use of budget reserves,
expenditure reductions, and tax increases
can all be used to address the problems
generated by revenue shortfalls.

The various panels of Figure 11 present
information about underperformance
for a number of key states.13 California
is presented because of its importance as
the most populace state and the one with
a large and highly visible ﬁscal problem.
The analysis certainly conﬁrms the prominent role that the state of California has
played in the state ﬁscal crisis debate.14
Colorado has sometimes been put forward as an example of ﬁscal prudence
stemming from its state–level spending
limits. The results here, though, show
that spending limits do not protect states
against revenue declines and underperformance.
Illinois and Michigan both experienced
underperformance in 2001 as well as 2002.
Both states experienced larger relative
underperformance in the 1980 recession
than in 2002. Massachusetts, like California, had a relative good performance in
2001 followed by a major decline in 2002.
New York had a similar, but milder pattern of underperformance. With neither
13

14

AN EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES TO
PREPARE FOR THE DOWNTURN
We address here the question of how
states could have prepared for the downturn. We use a stylized simulation of state
revenue and expenditure growth that incorporates reasonable assumptions about
revenue growth over the period from 1993
to 2003. Much of the debate centers on
what the states could have done prior to

Alaska, the worst performing state, is not included because of the unusual nature of its revenues system with
the heavy reliance on natural resource revenues.
Despite California’s large size and serious revenue problems, the state does not drive the national results. The
estimates were carried out with and without the state of California. We produced estimates that indicate that
the overall state revenue pattern does not change substantially when California data are excluded.
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Figure 11.

Revenue Underperformance in Selected States (Residuals as Percentage of Actual)
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Figure 11 (continued).

Revenue Underperformance in Selected States (Residuals as Percentage of Actual)

125

NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
at the lesser of the actual rate of increase or
at the limit set by particular budget rules.
Expenditures grow at a predetermined
rate according to the decision rule in place.
The simulations are used to examine four
different scenarios:16

the recession to avoid the problems that
occurred in 2002 and after. The debate has
focused on the possible use of relatively
inﬂexible taxing, spending, and/or saving
rules that could be put in place to avoid
problems. These place a premium on the
avoidance of discretionary tax and expenditure changes to address the problem.
The stated goal of most proponents of
budget rules is to provide ﬁscal stability
and discipline over the business cycle.
However, it is suggested below that a
number of other goals also inﬂuence the
choice of these rules.
A substantial body of technical literature addresses the issue of fixed
rules versus discretion in intertemporal
consumption–saving decisionmaking.15
Much of this analysis applies to fiscal
choices as well. The use of commitment
strategies such as balanced budget rules,
mandatory rainy day funds, and tax
and/or expenditure growth limits are
often proposed by both liberals and conservatives to improve ﬁscal discipline.
Obviously, each interest group wants a
commitment rule that favors its particular
interests. Fixed rules may be even more
important for governments as opposed to
individuals because such rules may limit
rent–seeking behavior in the ﬁght over
ﬁscal spoils. On the other hand, rules that
preserve discipline may also reduce ﬂexibility to make adjustments resulting from
shocks or new information. The trade–off
between the two and the question of when
to depart from predetermined rules is the
key issue.
A series of simulations (in real terms)
are presented for the period 1994 until
2003. It is assumed that revenues equal
expenditures in 1993 (after the recovery
from the 1990 recession) and that there
are no excess reserves at that date. In each
simulation, revenues are assumed to grow
15
16

1.

2.

3.

4.

The “What, me worry?” option
where expenditures are allowed to
grow at the same rate (3.95 percent)
as revenues grew from 1993 to
2001.
A cyclically–balanced budget where
revenues are equal to expenditures
over the 1993 to 2003 period. This
would entail expenditure growth of
3.6 percent per year.
A constrained revenue growth
scenario where expenditures are
allowed to grow at the rate (2.3
percent) that revenues grew from
1993 to 2003, two years beyond the
period in scenario 1. Under this
scenario, taxes are not permanently
reduced even though expenditures
are restrained.
A permanent tax cut scenario where
revenue increases are limited to
the lesser of two percent or the actual increase. When tax revenues are
poised to increase by more than two
percent, taxes are permanently cut to
limit the increase to two percent.

The “What, me worry?” strategy is, in
a sense, a straw man where state governments spend all of their tax revenue on
recurring expenditures during the expansion. No surpluses are generated during
good times to offset future downturns.
While this is an extreme example, it approximates the behavior of a number of
states. Simulation 1 (Figure 12) illustrates
the results of this strategy where revenues
and expenditures are in rough balance

This is summarized in Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2003).
All of these scenarios assume of a level of knowledge about future revenue growth that is not available to
actual decision makers.
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Figure 12.

Simulation 1: “What, me worry?” Scenario

until the bottom drops out in 2002 when
a massive deﬁcit results with even worse
problems in 2003. The top panel of each
simulation shows the yearly revenues
and expenditures while the lower panel
displays the annual surplus (deﬁcit) and
the cumulative surpluses (deﬁcits).
In this simulation, the 2002 and 2003
results are unsustainable, and thus discretionary changes (increased taxes and/or
decreased spending) would have to be
implemented. Obviously this rule will
not fulﬁll the goal of avoiding the need
for discretionary changes.
Simulation 2 (Figure 13) implements
a cyclically–balanced budget over the
1993–2002 period. Surpluses are generated during the period from 1994 to 2001
to offset the shortfall during the recession.
This supports a consistent growth in gov-

ernment spending that is not impacted by
the cycle. The problem with this scenario
is that the world does not end in 2003.
Even though the budget is balanced over
the period from 1993 to 2003, the existing
revenue structure for 2004 and future
years will fall far short (in the 10 percent
range) of covering expenditure demands
even assuming a resumption of normal
economic growth. The precipitous reduction in revenues in 2002 with no recovery
in 2003 results in a ratcheting down of the
revenue baseline so that it will no longer
support the predetermined expenditure
path, necessitating discretionary tax or
spending changes to put the state back
on track.
The practices in most states during the
expansion of the 1990s were a hybrid of
scenarios 1 and 2. States did not spend
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Figure 13.

Simulation 2: Cyclically Balanced Budget Scenario

would maintain the tax base while not
expanding the spending base. This would
be a substantial political challenge in most
states. In 2003, actual revenues would
match the expenditures although expenditures would be more than 10 percent
below the balanced budget scenario.
The ﬁnal scenario (Simulation 4 shown
in Figure 15) involves making permanent
tax cuts to dissipate rapidly expanding
revenues. Here expenditures are allowed
to grow at only two percent while any
revenue increases over two percent trigger permanent tax cuts to hold revenue
growth to the same pace. This approach
would indeed keep expenditures under
control, but it would not protect against
economic downturns. Under this scenario,
the economic downturn in 2002 would
reduce revenues by the same percentage (on a smaller base) as in the other

every penny of increasing revenues, but
they also fell short of accumulating reserves sufﬁcient for a cyclically–balanced
budget. Clearly the cyclically–balanced
budget approach is a much more stable
rule than scenario 1, but is does not avoid
the need for discretionary changes.
The constrained expenditure growth
scenario is the only one that could provide
stability over the cyclic, but it would come
at the cost of greatly repressed spending.
In Simulation 3 (Figure 14), annual spending would be limited to the growth rate of
revenues from 1993 to 2003 (2.3 percent)
even though actual revenue growth
would far exceed expenditure growth in
many years. This extra revenue could not
be returned to the taxpayers in terms of
permanent tax cuts, but it could be used
for one–time spending programs (such as
debt retirement) or one–time tax cuts. This
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Figure 14.

Simulation 3: Constrained Expenditure Growth Scenario

budget restraint and tax cuts during this
expansion phase could have avoided most
of the pain of the downturn. Liberals have
faulted the states for not ﬁnding ways,
such as the creation of large rainy–day
fund balances, to protect key spending
programs in the downturn.
In the analysis presented here, we
suggest that neither of these views is correct. First, the downturn after 2001 was
clearly a one–of–a–kind phenomenon in
its impact on state government tax revenues. The absolute decline in revenues
was unprecedented and the decline was
disproportionately large compared to the
size of the economic downturn. Budget
ofﬁcers and politicians cannot be reasonably faulted for being unprepared for the
decline in revenues that occurred in 2002
and 2003.

scenarios and create shortfalls as large
(as a percentage of revenues) as the other
approaches. Note the results for Colorado
presented earlier. Colorado has what appear to be effective controls on expenditure growth, but this did not protect the
state against major revenue reductions
in 2002. Colorado ranked ninth in terms
of the largest fall in real revenues and in
terms of underperformance in 2002. This
strategy may be a way of controlling the
growth of government, but it does not
provide stability over the cycle.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
States have been roundly criticized from
both the left and right for their handling
of the pre–recession growth period of the
late 1990s. Conservatives have argued that
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Figure 15.

Simulation 4: Permanent Tax Cuts Scenario

that began after 2001 should be thought
of not as the usual cyclical decline in revenues followed by a gradual recovery to
pre–recession levels. Instead, it is more of
a one–time, permanent ratcheting down
of revenues to a lower base from which
future revenues will grow. Economic
growth is unlikely to ever return revenues
to the old growth path. In such a case, it
is necessary to make permanent structural
adjustments to revenues or expenditures
to bring them into balance again. No automatic budget rule is likely to do this.
Obviously, rainy day funds, federal aid,
and the like are extremely valuable tools
during a downturn. However, in a major
disruption , they should not be viewed as
mechanisms for avoiding painful choices,
but as tools for making adjustments more
manageable. It appears, however, that in
many states the use of reserve funds as

Further, even if the dimensions of the
downturn had been foreseen, it is unlikely
that the commonly proposed strategies
would have been effective in avoiding the
need for major discretionary corrective
measures to deal with ﬁscal problems in
most states. In an average state, a rainy–
day fund of ﬁve percent of revenues at the
beginning of 2002 would have been dissipated the ﬁrst year of the downturn leaving
a huge gap between actual revenues and
desired spending for 2003 and future years.
Similarly, permanent tax cuts enacted during the expansion of the late 1990s would
have lowered the tax base, but it would
not have protected this lower base from
the precipitous revenue declines after 2001,
leaving a huge revenue shortfall.
Even infusions of temporary federal aid
as advocated by some analysts would have
been inadequate as well. The problem
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local governments since the property tax
weathered the recession much better than
the income and sales taxes.18
Why is such importance placed on
inﬂexible budget rules by both liberals
and conservatives? The ostensive goal
of both is to provide ﬁscal stability over
the business cycle. However, these rules
may also be vehicles to pursue other
goals. For example, the prime purpose of
expenditure growth limitations for conservatives is not to provide stability, but
to reduce the relative size of government.
Similarly, rules that funnel revenues into
budget stabilization funds also may be
a way of protecting the tax base against
permanent tax cuts during expansions.
Even proponents of temporary federal aid
to states may be primarily interested in the
macro goal of neutralizing the potentially
pro–cyclical impacts of state tax increases
or expenditure cuts, and not the goal of
state budget stability.
In summary, the size and unusual
nature of the recent downturn in state
revenues will require major discretionary structural changes in state revenues
and expenditures to bring states back
into fiscal balance. Reactive policies
that may have been effective in the
past, such as waiting for economic
growth to solve the problems, will not be
sufﬁcient.

well as temporary expedients such as the
sale of assets and borrowing to fund current expenditures have been employed
not to smooth the transition to a new
long run equilibrium, but, instead, to put
off the day of reckoning when the hard
choices have to be made (see Maag and
Merriman (2003)).
It should also be noted that the well–
known problems with the structure of
state tax systems, such as the failure to
tax services under the sales tax, problems
taxing e–commerce, and the shrinking of
the corporate base, were not the cause
of the states’ recent problems. In fact,
many of longstanding proposals for
state tax reform would have had little
impact on protecting states from the
consequences of the recent downturn
and, in some cases, may have actually made matters worse. For example,
one of the goals of state tax reform has
been to make tax revenues more responsive
to economic growth to keep pace better
with the rate of growth of expenditure demands. Increasing the progressivity of the
income tax and the inclusion of services
in the sales tax base are examples of such
policies.17 While these may be worthy
ideas, had such changes been in place the
problems of the downturn would very
likely have been more, not less severe.
States also are searching for ways to reverse the erosion of the corporate income
tax base. However, a greater reliance on
the corporate income tax increases the
volatility of state tax systems and would
have worsened the ﬁscal problems of the
states during the recent downturn. Finally,
the longstanding movement away from
local property taxes to state–level taxes
accentuated the problems of state and
17

18
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APPENDIX
The state–level data on revenue are from the
Census Bureau and cover years 1977 through
2002. Annual data for state personal income
are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and
cover the same period. The following equation
relates total annual state taxes to state personal
income and state ﬁxed effects:
tax_revenuei,t = β . personal_incomei,t
+ state_dummies . γi + εi,t = αi + β
. personal_income + ε ,
i,t
i,t
where i denotes the state and t the year of the
observation. Thus, tax_revenueit represents total
taxes for state i in year t.
Because tax revenue and personal income
are nonstationary (i.e., means and variances are
not constant over time), logged differences (i.e.,
growth rates) are estimated instead of levels.
Thus, the estimating equation becomes:

(

)

tax_revenuei,t
rev_growthi,t = ln ——————— = β
tax_revenuei,t–1

(

)

personal_inci,t
. ln ———————
+ state_dummiesi,t . γi + εi,t.
personal_inci,t–1
The estimated parameters are then used to
generate predicted revenue growth rates for
1978 through 2002. Next, the predicted growth
rates are used to calculate predicted state tax
revenue, using actual tax revenue in 1977 as the
base. Thus, for a given year, t-, state i’s predicted
tax revenue can be expressed such that,
ˆ
tax_revenue
=
i,t

[Π
–
t=t

. tax_revenue
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i,1977

.

]

ˆ
(1 + rev_growth
)
i,t

t=1978

